Siege of Vicksburg
(May 18, 1863 - July 4, 1863)
(May 18, 1863 - July 4, 1863)
Vicksburg, detail from View of Vicksburg, 1863
Library of Congress, Geography and Map Division
The Siege of Vicksburg began as anything but a siege. Gen. Grant, whose performance to this point had been nothing short of brilliant, ordered two frontal assaults in four days against the formidable defensive works of Vicksburg. In hindsight they represented a disastrous blunder that resulted in extremely high casualties with no significant gain in military position. The finger-pointing and recriminations that followed the repulse of the assaults cloud exactly what happened during the May 22nd assaults by Lawler's Brigade of Carr's Division and Landram's brigade of A. J Smith's Division, which included the 48th Ohio. The partial success achieved by the valiant sacrifices of these brigades in the poorly planned assault on the Railroad Redoubt led to statements by Gen. McClernand that compounded the already discordant relationship between McClernand and Grant and would ultimately lead to Gen. McClernand's dismissal. Detailed reports by Gen. A. J. Smith and Col. Landram exist for all battles before Vicksburg and for the action after Vicksburg at Jackson, but reports by these men on the Vicksburg Campaign itself are missing, although fragments of Col. Landram's report survive in the "History of the 77th Illinois". Many historic accounts take Gen. Grant's version of the Vicksburg Campaign as the definitive account. They portray Gen. McClernand as an incompetent and insubordinate political general, and A. J. Smith as hesitating and lacking in aggressiveness. They also minimize the temporary successes gained by McClernand's Corps at the Railroad Redoubt and the Second Texas Lunette on May 22, 1863. A more recent study of McClernand by Richard L. Kiper reveals him to be extremely courageous, aggressive and highly competent in handling those in his command. Similarly, the characterization of A. J. Smith as hesitant, rather than aggressive and in command of the situation, is totally inconsistent with the old dragoon's behavior at any time, before or after the Vicksburg Campaign. It is not inconceivable that the reports of Landram, who remained a Colonel throughout the war, and Smith, who never was given responsibility or credit commensurate with his ability and accomplishments, were left out of the record for political reasons.
Gen. Grant himself nicely sums up the Siege of Vicksburg and the two early attempts to take the city by storm in his memoirs as follows.
On the 19th there was constant skirmishing with the enemy while we were getting into better position. The enemy had been much demoralized by his defeats at Champion's Hill and the Big Black, and I believed he would not make much effort to hold Vicksburg. Accordingly, at two o'clock I ordered an assault. It resulted in securing more advanced positions for all our troops where they were fully covered from the fire of the enemy.
The 20th and 21st were spent in strengthening our position and in making roads in rear of the army, from Yazoo River or Chickasaw Bayou. Most of the army had now been for three weeks with only five days' rations issued by the commissary. They had an abundance of food, however, but began to feel the want of bread. I remember that in passing around to the left of the line on the 21st, a soldier, recognizing me, said in rather a low voice, but yet so that I heard him, "Hard tack." In a moment the cry was taken up all along the line, "Hard tack! Hard tack!" I told the men nearest to me that we had been engaged ever since the arrival of the troops in building a road over which to supply them with everything they needed. The cry was instantly changed to cheers. By the night of the 21st all the troops had full rations issued to them. The bread and coffee were highly appreciated.
I now determined on a second assault. Johnston was in my rear, only fifty miles away, with an army not much inferior in numbers to the one I had with me, and I knew he was being reinforced. There was danger of his coming to the assistance of Pemberton, and after all he might defeat my anticipations of capturing the garrison if, indeed, he did not prevent the capture of the city. The immediate capture of Vicksburg would save sending me the reinforcements which were so much wanted elsewhere, and would set free the army under me to drive Johnston from the State. But the first consideration of all was-the troops believed they could carry the works in their front, and would not have worked so patiently in the trenches if they had not been allowed to try.
The attack was ordered to commence on all parts of the line at ten o'clock A.M. on the 22d with a furious cannonade from every battery in position. All the corps commanders set their time by mine so that all might open the engagement at the same minute. The attack was gallant, and portions of each of the three corps succeeded in getting up to the very parapets of the enemy and in planting their battle flags upon them; but at no place were we able to enter. General McClernand reported that he had gained the enemy's entrenchments at several points, and wanted reinforcements. I occupied a position from which I believed I could see as well as he what took place in his front, and I did not see the success he reported. But his request for reinforcements being repeated I could not ignore it, and sent him Quimby's division of the 17th corps. Sherman and McPherson were both ordered to renew their assaults as a diversion in favor of McClernand. This last attack only served to increase our casualties without giving any benefit whatever. As soon as it was dark our troops that had reached the enemy's line and been obliged to remain there for security all day, were withdrawn; and thus ended the last assault upon Vicksburg.
I now determined upon a regular siege -- to "outcamp the enemy," as it were and to incur no more losses. The experience of the 22d convinced officers and men that this was best, and they went to work on the defenses and approaches with a will. With the navy holding the river, the investment of Vicksburg was compete. As long as we could hold our position the enemy was limited in supplies of food, men and munitions of war to what they had on hand. These could not last always.
U. S. Grant
JOHN RICHARDON'S LETTERS FROM VICKSBURG
WILLIAM J. SROFE'S LETTERS FROM VICKSBURG
On May 18th Gen. Grant's triumphant army approached the gates of Vicksburg. Gen. Sherman's Corps was advancing toward the north of the city on the Graveyard Road. Just to the south of Sherman, Gen. McPherson's Corps was advancing toward the Great Redoubt on the Jackson Road, and General Gen. McClernand's Corps moved toward the center of the city's fortifications along the Baldwin's Ferry Road, with General Burbridge's brigade of General A. J. Smith's division in the vanguard and Col. Landram's Brigade close behind. Gen. A. J. Smith's division halted for the night about 2.5 miles from the Vicksburg works (Cyrus Hussey's estimate of four miles was a bit high.) Gen Smith's Division moved south of the road to a position opposite the rifle pits, between the Square Fort and the Railroad Redoubt.
The 48th moved forward at 2:00 P.M We know from Capt. Hussey that Col. Landram's Brigade was arrayed in two lines, with the 77th Ill. and 98th Ill in advance, the 19th Ky. and the 48th Ohio in the second line, and the 130th Ill. in reserve. Bering and Montgomery's account describes a more active assault than Hussey's, but Hussey's account, written on the spot, is likely to reflect the actual action seen by the regiment that day. After much exchange of fire and little damage, they withdrew for the night. To the north, Sherman's Corps made a furious assault on the Stockade Redan, which was repulsed with heavy losses.
The beef and crackers provided on the 19th is the first the men had in a long time. They had been on short rations for days. Hussey is greatly cheered on the 20th by the news that the new supply line from the Yazoo River has been established.
The Engineers on both sides quietly planned their measures and counter measures.
Photos courtesy of Bruce Schulze, CivilWarAlbum.com
Vicksburg Map Detail courtesy of Library of Congress, Geography and Map Division
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On the morning of May 19th, we advanced again, and after a two hours' march, over a very rugged and hilly country, we came in sight of Vicksburg, which is built on a series of high bluffs, and contained 10,000 inhabitants. The defenses of the city consisted of a chain of forts, at intervals of 800 yards, for a distance of seven miles, both right and left, resting on the Mississippi river, and forming a semi-circle around the city. The rifle pits filled the intervals between the forts. In front of these was a ditch fifteen feet wide and ten feet deep. The works were more formidable than we expected to find them, showing that they were fully prepared to receive us.
As soon, as the enemy discovered us advancing over the hills, they opened on us with their artillery. Our batteries were hurried forward into position, and under their fire we advanced a short distance and halted in a ravine. At 10 A. M., Gen. A. J. Smith ordered all the officers of the Regiment to report at his headquarters. On arriving there, he told them to inform their men that at 2 o'clock P. M. we would storm the rebel works. The news was received by the Regiment in a quiet and serious manner, and the suspense until 2 o'clock was somewhat like that of the culprit awaiting the hour of his execution. Promptly at the hour the signal-gun was fired, and the order came, "Forward, 48th!" We started up the hill, and on reaching the summit we were greeted with shot and shell from the rebel forts; but without faltering, on we went, down into the next ravine, through brush and over fallen trees. Arriving at the foot of a hill, we continued up the narrow valley under the guns of the fort, and drove the rebel outposts into their fortifications, when a halt was ordered, to allow the troops to join us on the left. By the time they made the connection the sun was setting in the west. Our opportunity for taking Vicksburg that day had passed, and we bivouacked for the night.
John A. Bering & Thomas Montgomery, 1880
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Tuesday 19th Moved forward about 1 1/2 mi. in the morning. Our division formed in line. Our brigade in two lines 77th & 97th Ill. in advance, 19th [Ky.] & 48th in second line. 130th Ill. formed the reserve. Rebel works on a high hill - their troops on front passing into the rifle pits. Country very much broken. Cannonading in the rear of works - were we guess it may be gunboats engaging batteries in front, or Sherman on the right of our line. News came that Serg't McVay [Co. A] died at Cayuga on the 17th inst. From the effect of a wound received when in the line of duty. Troops not in position at 10.00 A.M. Osterhaus coming into line at that hour. Our line about 1 1/2 or 2 mi. from Rebel works. There seems to be no movement of the Army to indicate a fight this site of fortifications. Said to be rifle pits 1/2 mi. in our advance. Word that Sherman has Hanes Bluffs. Order to advance at 2:00 P.M. Moved forward as formed within 1/2 mi. of works. Considerable of firing - Mostly at the Artillery Men -- & the rebels can hardly fire their pieces. No general charge. Rebs shelled our position considerable but did not injure any one in our Regt. But little our artillery engaged. We don't seem to be doing any good. Q.M. brought us cooked beef & crackers. Lay in position at night on arms. The operation of the whole line seems to correspond with those of our own brigade. Cyrus Hussey |
Report of Col. Peter J. Sullivan
(not present at event)
On the 19th, we advanced and drove the enemy's pickets out of
their rifle-pits into their fortifications.
Peter J. Sullivan (OR 8/4/63)
Lieut. Peter C. Hains, U.
S. Corps of Engineers, (OR 7/30/63)
The corps arrived in front, or in rear, of Vicksburg, as it is
sometimes called, on May 19, from which time to the 22d instant
every effort was made to determine by reconnaissances the weakest
points of the enemy's line, and to obtain as accurate information
of the ground as possible…
…I had previously, on the night of the 19th, selected the
hill near the crossing of the railroad and wagon road for a battery
of two 30-pounders and two 20-pounders,…
Peter C. Hains
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May 20th, we remained there [before the works] until
3 P. M., when we moved to the left of our Division. On arriving
there, we were ordered across an open field to gain a strong
position behind a bluff, still nearer to the rebel works. We
went over the field on double-quick, one company at a time, in
full range of their artillery and infantry fire. The movement
was very successfully executed, and our loss was one color-guard
mortally wounded. Adjutant McGill made a narrow escape, with
a ball through his cap. From this position we returned the enemy's
fire with considerable effect. At 9 P. M. we were relieved by
the 11th Wisconsin, and returned to the rear.
John A. Bering & Thomas Montgomery, 1880
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Wednesday 20th Our cannon firing a little more briskly than yesterday. Firing of the Inf. Similar to that of yesterday & keeping the Rebs from Guns. Our heavy cannon firing very accurately. No change up to 9.15 A.M. [Serg't] Ben Ladd join Co. [A] though quite weak. Wrote note to My Wife at 9.30 A.M. Orders to prepare for charge at 1.00 P.M. Changed to go as far as possible. Our Regiment advanced and attached itself to the left of the 131st Ill. according to orders within 500 yards of works. Chaffin of Co. K - Color Guard - badly wounded in thigh. No other casualties. Forced the enemy to change position of one gun. Relieved after dark by a Co. of 77th Ill. who went on Picket in our front. Our Brigade returned to Ravine about 400 yards in rear of position. Our men constructing rifle pits & throwing up redoubts to plant batteries at night. Provisions very scarce but we expect plenty tomorrow - for we now have communication by way of Haines Bluff. Cyrus Hussey |
Report of Major Samuel H.
Lockett, C. S. Engineers, chief Engineer, July 26, 1863.
Between the 18th and 22nd, the enemy succeeded in establishing
their line of circumvallation at about the distance of 800 yards,
extending from our extreme left to in front of the square redoubt
on the right of Brigadier-General Lee's line. The fire of their
artillery and sharpshooters soon became quite annoying, and showed
the necessity of erecting numerous traverses to prevent enfilading
fires, and the importance of having covered approached from the
rear. All of these improvements were made as rapidly as possible
by the engineers, with fatigue parties working at night.
Samuel H. Lockett
Of the many battles the 48th Ohio fought, three stand out in terms of the importance played by the regiment and the losses they suffered. The first was Shiloh, where they were among the first attacked, and where they held together with the rest of their brigade, serving as some of Gen Sherman's few dependable troops. The third was Sabine Crossroads, where their brigade was pushed to its limits and ordered into an ambush where they fought valiantly until flanked, and, out of ammunition, they were forced to surrender. The second was what Capt. Posegate would later recall as "That memorable charge on the Confederate works at Vicksburg on that bloody 22nd of May, 1863" where their brigade and that of Gen. Lawler charged the railroad redoubt and adjacent works, gained a precarious foothold, and were then driven from their positions because poor planning had failed to provide reserves to follow up on their partial success. Here the voice of Major Motes was silenced by a mortal wound and Cyrus Hussey recorded the names of men in his diary as they fell. Here Sergeant Vore planted the colors on the works and the color guard remained upon them, along side the colors of the 77th Illinois. Here Corporal Carman won his Medal of Honor for saving the colors from a furious countercharge by the Waul's Texas Legion. Bering and Montgomery state in the regimental history that:
Our army lost on the 22d, 3,000 killed and wounded, and nothing accomplished. Gen. Grant became convinced by this time that Vicksburg was too strong to be taken by assault, and therefore wisely concluded to lay a regular siege.
The basic disposition of the troops in front of the railroad redoubt can be seen in Grabau's excellent work "Ninety-Eight Days". Lawler's report in the OR, the existing fragment of Landram's report in the History of the 77th Illinois, Hussey's diary, Sullivan's report and Corporal Carmin's story allow us to piece together a reasonably consistent account of what happened on this important day in the history of the regiment.
The Railroad Redoubt was a fortified salient extending along the south side of the Southern Railroad of Mississippi, where it exited the defensive works around Vicksburg. The redoubt was designed by the Confederate engineers as part of a complex, including the Second Texas Lunette to the north and the Square Fort to the south, that provided enfilading fire covering the approaches to the works anywhere in this vicinity. Any assault on one of these forts had to carry the others as well if it was to be successful. The back side of the fort, which was defended by the 46th Alabama, was open. The rifle pits just to the south of the fort were defended by the 46th Alabama and the 30th Alabama. General Pemberton had selected elite troops, such as Waul's Texas Legion, to act as a reserve to shore up any breaks which occurred in the works, which were defended by troops thinly stretched along some parts of the defensive line. Waul's Texas Legion was stationed along the Railroad inside the works near the Railroad Redoubt.
On the 20th Carr's Division had moved in front, replacing A. J. Smith's Division in the front line. The 11th Wisconsin had specifically replaced the 48th Ohio. Landram's Brigade then moved into the ravine and helped dig emplacements for artillery that increasingly assailed the Rebel Works on the 21st.
All morning on the 22nd an intense artillery barrage pounded the works around Vicksburg as the two Brigades formed in lines. General Lawler's Brigade of Carr's Division was formed in double lines in front and Col. Landram's Brigade of A. J. Smith's Division formed in the rear, also in double lines. This formation, which would result in the mixing of troops from different divisions in the confusion of battle, seems foolish, but Grabau states that it was standard practice at the time. Also unwise was the lack of any reserve that resulted from the uniform assault at all points along the rebel works. Both Landram and McClernand would remind Gen. Grant of this in their reports, which did not serve to raise them in his favor.
Federal Assault on the Railroad Redoubt on May 22, 1863, 11:00 AM
Considerable mixing of regiments occurred once the vanguard reached the walls of the fort.
Map adapted from Grabau, Warren E., Ninety-Eight Days: A Geographer's View of the Vicksburg Campaign
and Library of Congress, Geography and Map Division
On the Left: At 10:00 Lawler's Brigade moved forward. On the left, the 11th Wis. and the left companies of the 22nd Iowa charged past the tip of the Railroad redoubt and into a deep ravine filled with abatis. The ravine wall was too steep to advance, and the men were ordered by their commander to hold their positions in the ravine. The 97th Ill., which had been detached from Landram's brigade, followed the 11th Wisconsin into the ravine and was pinned down along with them. At 1:30 Gen. McClernand ordered Col. Landram to send two regiments to Gen. Lawler's aid. The 19th Ky. and the 130th Ill. moved to the support of the troops in the ravine, only to join them in their hopeless situation.
On the Right: At 10:00 the main body of the 22nd Iowa charged the tip of the redoubt, which had been heavily damaged by artillery fire. The flag of the 22nd Iowa was planted on the works. A few of the men under Sergt. Joseph Griffith entered the fort, engaging the defenders in hand to hand combat and capturing a portion of the interior. The 21st Iowa followed, and remained in the ravine with elements of the 22nd Iowa. Col. Landram's Brigade came into action on this side about 10:45 when the 77th Ill. charged in to support the 22nd Iowa. They took and held a position along the railroad where they planted their flag on the works and also entered the fort. For a short time elements of the 77th Ill., the 22nd Iowa and at least one officer from the 130th Ill. were hotly engaged within the fort, before retreating to the walls of the works where the 77th Ill. held a position where the wall of the redoubt meets the railroad. At 1:00 the 48th Ohio joined the 77th Ill., after charging into a ravine, reorganizing themselves, and moving to the edge of the works. Color Sergt. Vore planted the flag on the works and the eight-man color guard remained on the works, adjacent to the 77th Illinois Color guard. Corp. Isaac Carman describes firing while a color guard member of the 77th loaded for him. The position of the 48th Ohio was near the works, since Corp. Carman was able to quickly consult with Capt. Posegate of Co. D about what to do with the flag.
The OR records a desperate message from Col. Landram to A. J. Smith:
Headquarters Second Brigade, Tenth Division,
May 22, 1863-2.40 p.m.
General Smith, Commanding Division:Our men are holding the flanks of the fort in front of us. There is a heavy cross-fire upon us, and we have lost many killed and wounded. They are hurling hand-grenades upon us, and hurting us considerably in that way.
Yours, & etc.
W. J. Landram,
Brigade Commander
General Smith had no reserves to send into the breach. Had the attack been concentrated at several points, instead of all along the line, reserves might have made a breakthrough, but as it was, the assault would be in vain.
At 4:00, after several unsuccessful attempts by the 46th Ala. and Waul's Texas Legion failed to dislodge elements of Lawler's and Landram's brigades from the works, a charge by 35 volunteers from Waul's Texas Legion drove them from the wall, capturing the colors of the 77th Ill. It is this attack that is described in Isaac Carman's account about how he saved the colors of the 48th Ohio. The men held on in the ravine, finding what cover they could, until they were ordered to withdraw at 8:00 pm under the cover of darkness. The dead and wounded were left behind. The wounded suffered in the sun of day and cold of night for almost three days before a truce was arranged to remove them from the field.
The next few days the Union Army licked its wounds, tightened its grip to prevent a breakout or an attack from the rear by Johnson, and established its supply line from the Yazoo River. Food was plentiful again outside the walls. The real siege began.
Railroad Redoubt at Vicksburg
Monument to 48th OVI furthest approach at lower right.
Photo courtesy of Bruce Schulze, CivilWarAlbum.com
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Lieut. Peter C. Hains, U.
S. Corps of Engineers, (OR 7/30/63)
…on the 21st the other 30-pounders on the right of the road.
A small parapet was thrown up in front of each gun to protect
the cannoneers from the enemy's riflemen. This battery, which
was commanded by Major Maloney, of the First Infantry, U. S.
Army, was increased in caliber during the latter part of the
siege by mounting two 8-inch Dahlgren guns, procured from Admiral
Porter's fleet, in the river, and moving the 20-pounders closer
to the works and the chief of artillery for the necessary intrenching
tools, and for proper siege materials, heavy guns, mortars, &c.
Coehorn mortars were needed particularly. No mortars could be
obtain, and only three 24-pounders (siege) and two 8-inch Dalgrens,
in addition to the three 30-pounder Parrots belonging to the
corps.
In the latter part of the siege the want of mortars was so severely
left that I gave orders to have wooden mortars made, to be used
with small charges of powder and light shells (6 and 12 pounds).
Some naval hand thrown any considerable distance. Even when the
approaches were only 10 feet from the ditch, it required an extraordinarily
powerful man to throw one into the works.
The week elapsed before any considerable number of intrenching
tools could be procured, in the mean time the most was made of
the few that could be gathered together around camp and from
the pioneers.
Peter C. Hains
The next day, May 21st, was employed in long-range artillery
practice and maneuvering for advantageous positions.
John A. Bering & Thomas Montgomery, 1880
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Thursday 21st Weather fine & has been since we invested this place. Carr's Div. In advance this morning. Our success up to last night but meager. I think we could take the place by storm but the loss would be severe. I think we had better reduce the place by siege & with long range cannon. Reinforcements arrived. Rebels repairing works last night. Mortar boats shelling the City. Rumors that reinforcements are coming to the enemy. Cannonading early in the morning. Two or three wounded on our side. Cyrus Hussey |
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May 22d , orders were issued for a general assault along the
lines at 11 o'clock A. M. The echo of the signal-gun had scarcely
died away, when our brigade was ordered forward to take the fort
in our front, situated on a hill, in an angle of their intrenchments,
where their guns commanded every approach. Down the ravine we
started on double-quick, checking our speed for a moment in a
deep gully, to reform our line before facing the fort, whose
incessant fire shook the ground at every discharge. Then on we
went, up the hill, through the brush and undergrowth, but did
not check our speed until the right of the Regiment, in conjunction
with the left of the 77th Illinois, reached the fort. Leaping
into the ditch, and climbing the parapet, the colors of the 48th
Ohio and 77th Illinois were planted on the fort. The rebel gunners
surrendered and were hurried to the rear. During this charge
Major Moats was mortally wounded in the knee.
We were now exposed to an enfilading fire from the right and left, which was thinning our ranks at a fearful rate. We were left there to contend against great odds, without any assistance whatever. At 4 P. M. the rebels massed their troops on our front, and attacked us with great fury, and re-took the fort, capturing the colors and fifty men of the 77th Ills. Ike Carmin [Isaac Carman], one of our color guards, with a bayonet-wound in the leg, clung to our flag and saved it from sharing the same fate. This was the signal for a second attack on both sides. Another charge was ordered all along the line. It was a glorious sight to see our troops advancing in plain view over the hills, to our assistance. But as soon as they got within range of the rebel fire, they were mown down and almost annihilated. So destructive was the concentrated fire of the enemy, that not a single man of those sent to reinforce us reached our line. In the meantime, a few spades and shovels had been brought up, with which the Regiment hastily threw up rude entrenchments, from which they kept up an unceasing fire until dark, when the firing ceased and all became quiet. We remained on the battlefield until the town clock in Vicksburg struck the hour of 10 P. M., when we were ordered to retreat, which we accomplished without being discovered by the enemy. Before the engagement commenced, stretcher-bearers were detailed to carry the wounded of the Regiment off the battle-field. They succeeded in removing all the wounded to the rear.
When we retreated we attempted to carry off our dead, but on account of the darkness and the rugged nature of the locality, we had to abandon the undertaking, and leave them where they fell.
The following is an extract from the Cincinnati Commercial, of June 1st, 1863:
"On the left, Gen. McClernand commenced the assault earlier than any other commander. The first advance was made by McClernand's center, Gen. A. J. Smith's Divison of two brigades, commanded by Col. Landrum [Landram] and Gen. Burbridge. As early as 11 o'clock Col. Landrum's men took a fort, and were in actual possession of it. Gen. Osterhouse, on their left, made a breach in the south side of the works, with his artillery. There were two companies of rebel soldiers in it at the time. One of them ran away, and the other actually burrowed their way through the earth to our men in front, and surrendered as prisoners. Landrum [Landram], on obtaining possession of the fort, put a pioneer force at work to throw up earth-works in the rear, so as to bring the guns of the fort to bear upon the rebels. In constructing the fortifications, the rebels left the rear of all the forts open, to give them an opportunity to assail our men, in the event of our success in driving them out. The flags of the 48th Ohio, 77th Illinois and 19th Ky. floated from the inner slope of the parapet from half-past 11 A. M. till 4 P. M. At the latter hour the rebels were seen preparing for a charge, to re-take the fort. An entire brigade was about to be pitted against a few companies. Our men did not receive the support which had been promised them, and were compelled to fall back, leaving the enemy again in possession of the fort. The 48th Ohio acquitted itself very creditably in the affair. The conduct of its officers and men is highly spoken of. I enclose a list of the casualties of the Regiment. * * *
"List of killed and wounded, 48th Ohio: Lieut. Col. Parker, wounded in the face with rifle-ball; Maj. V. H. Moats, wounded in leg; Co. A, Serg't. John Yost, killed; Alonzo Smith, killed; Mahlon Davis, killed; David Woosley, wounded dangerously; Isaac McPherson, wounded dangerously; Isaac Carmin [Carman], wounded severely; Co. B, John Cooper, wounded dangerously; Isaac Scott, wounded dangerously; Co. C, Serg't. Charles Weber, killed; Serg't. J. D. Leonard, wounded slightly; Corp. Sam'l Hair, wounded slightly; George Pfister, wounded severely; L. A. Williams, wounded mortally; Co. D, Joseph Balon, killed; Serg't. John Wilson, wounded slightly; Co. E, Carl Hough, wounded severely; Henry Stitchter, wounded severely; Co. F, Lewis Farris, wounded dangerously; John Kead, wounded severely; Thos. O'Borke, wounded severely; Co. G, Serg't. James Sweet, killed; Peter A. Deler, wounded in the head; Co. H, Jacob Davidson, wounded severely; Co. I, Elliott J Bich, killed; John W. Hubbard, killed; Chris. O. Sroffe, killed; Co. K, Elias Conover, wounded slightly; Henry Knob, wounded slightly; W. A. Chaffin, killed. * * * Total, ten killed and twenty-five wounded. MACK."
The work entitled, "The Battles for the Union," in giving an account of that charge, says:
"The colors of the 48th Ohio and 77th Illinois were placed on the bastion, and within the next quarter of an hour the brigade of Benton and Burbridge, fired by this example, had carried the ditch of another strong earthwork, while Capt. White, of the Chicago Mercantile Battery, carried forward one of his guns by hand to the ditch, double shotted it and fired into the embrasures."
Gen. Sherman, in his "Memoirs," says:
"The two several assaults made May 22d, on the lines of Vicksburg, had failed, by reason of the great strength of the position, and the determined fighting of its garrison. I have since seen the position of Sevastopol, and without hesitation, I declare that at Vicksburg to have been the more difficult of the two."
John A. Bering & Thomas Montgomery, 1880
Lieut. Peter C. Hains, U.
S. Corps of Engineers, (OR 7/30/63)
…On the 22nd instant, the Thirteenth Army Corps made an
assault on the enemy's line, the salients B [Second Texas
Lunette] and C [Railroad Redoubt] being the principal
points of attack. The storming parties succeeded in scaling the
parapet of C, it having been battered considerably by the fire
from the 30-pounder battery, near the crossing of the wagon road
over the railroad. The assault failed…
Peter C. Hains
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Ten pieces of Artillery planted in front of our right last
night. Our Reg't detached to join Gen. l of Carr's Div. Our Artillery
playing briskly on the enemy. Mistake in above about our being
detached. Our Brigade to support Lolly's [Lawler's] Brigade.
Lolly in two lines & our brigade the same. 48th & 77th
[Ill.] 1st line of ours & 19th [Ky.] &
97th [Ill.] the second. Charged on the works at 11.00
A.M. & took possession of our Fort. Firing kept up very briskly
until time of this note 3.00 P.M. [Pvt.] Alonzo Smith
[Co. A] mortally wounded & [Pvt. David] Woosly
[Co. A, mortal wound] badly & Corp. Carman [Color-guard,
Co. A] slightly. [Pvt. James Co. A] deserted ranks.
Some 15 or 20 prisoners - deserters - came over. No information.
Serg't [James] Sweet Co. G killed Some other wounded in
the reg't. [Pvt. Joseph] Balow Co. "D" Killed.
Maj. Moats wounded just below knee [wound mortal]. Serg't
[John] Yost [Co. A] mortally wounded by shell in
thigh. [Pvt.] Isaac McPherson [Co. A] severely
wounded below the knee. Smith & Yost died of wounds in the
evening. Rebels draw us out of the Fort in the evening &
took some of the 77th [Ill.] & 22nd Iowa prisoners.
They got the colors of the 77th Ill. Our Div. Draws back in night
& formed in line about 600 yards from front. Cyrus Hussey |
A Flag The Rebels Didn't Get
By Isaac Carman
At ten o'clock
on the morning of May 22d, at Vicksburg, our brigade captured a fort, together
with a number of prisoners. The colors of the Forty-eighth Ohio and Seventy-seventh
Illinois Infantry, were ordered to be planted on the fort, which was done
by Sergeant Dave Vore and one of the Illinois men.
We were then in a very desperate position, and, in addition to the enemy's fire, received some of the shells of our own batteries, which fell short of their mark. To relieve myself somewhat of this uncomfortable situation. I unfixed my bayonet and dug a little trench near the top of the works, close by our flag. An Illinois man crawled beneath me into an excavation caused by the explosion of a shell. We arranged that he should reload our guns, while I continued firing at the enemy whenever one of them would come within my sight and range. This lasted several hours, when the rebels brought a battery to bear on my position, and, for some time shells were singing their song so dangerously near to my head, that my position became hardly tenable. A little letter the enemy began massing troops at this point. I was able to distinctly hear their commands and see their numerous bayonets. Then I thought it high time to notify our officers of the danger our flag was in. I noticed that our men were some distance behind, in the ditch but determined to rescue the flag, [I] rushed back, and received from Capt. Posegate [Co. D] the permission to get it, if possible. I seized it none too soon, for the terrific assault came sooner than I expected.
I reached the top of the bastion and grasped the Ohio flag; the Illinois standard could not be saved. How I got down and paced the hundred feet to our ditch, through all that tremendous fire, I cannot tell. In my great haste I ran right into the bayonet of one of my own company [Co. A], who was then in charging position. Driving its entire length into my leg and thigh. Although I almost dropped into a faint, I had enough presence of mind to run the shaft of the flag into the ground and hang onto it. My comrades pulled me down into their ditch and got the bayonet out of my leg. I was taken to the rear.
Isaac A. Carmen [Carman]
Besides the exploit which Corporal Isaac H. Carmen [Carman] here describes, he also saved the lives of a number of his comrades, by seizing a shell with a burning fuse, and throwing it back to the Rebels, whence it came, slaughtering them with their own weapon of death, intended for Union men.
W.F. Beyer and O.F. Keydel, 1903
Deeds of Valor: How America's Civil War Heroes Won the Medal
of Honor, Perrien-Keydel Co. Detroit. Michigan: Reprint of above
by Longmeadow
Press. Stamford. CT. 1992
(pp. 201-202)
Report of Col. Peter J. Sullivan (not present at event)
May 22, we engaged in the charge on the enemy's fortifications in rear of Vicksburg, and, after a most sanguinary and bloody engagement, succeeded in planting our bullet riddled flag on the enemy's fort nearly in front of us, where it remained till evening, when the enemy massed his forces in vastly superior numbers to ours, and regained the possession of the fort. Perceiving his intention, we saved our flag before the charge was made.
At 10 P.M. we were ordered
to fall back. The Forty-eighth was never driven back from its
position near the fort until ordered to fall back, as above stated.
There were none with our flag while planted on this fort save
the color-guard, the regiment being a little to the left of the
fort at the time.
…
Those brave fellows, the color-guard, who were in the charge
on the enemy in the rear of Vicksburg on May 22, ought to be
remembered and held up as true heroes by the brave and true.
Their names are David L. Vore, Company E, Color Sergeant; Isaac
H. Carmin [Carmen], corporal Company A; Isaac Scott, corporal
Company B; Metcalf Bell, corporal Company F; Jesse Ellis, private
Company D; Allan Pierce, corporal Company D; Albert N. Shumard,
corporal Company G; James D. Wolf, private Company K.
…
Our casualties in this engagement were, so far as I have been
able to ascertain, 32 enlisted men killed, wounded and missing;
also Major Moats, one of our bravest and truest of men, was mortally
wounded, and has since died. Captain Gunsallus, of Company F,
a gallant and deserving officer, was severely wounded, but is,
I am happy to say, fast recovering. Lieut. Col. Job R. Parker,
by some means or other, received a very slight flesh wound on
the cheek-bone, mearly breaking the skin. He shortly after retired
from the field, and on May 31 went hoime on a 20 days leave of
absence. He has never returned to his regiment nor reported to
these headquarters.
Peter J. Sullivan (OR 8/4/63)
[Statements about Col. Parker made by Col. Sullivan have to be viewed in light of the antagonsitic relationship that existed between the two men. See the War between the Colonels. Parker's wound is sometimes called a slight wound from a musket ball, but Dr. P. A. Willis, Surgeon of the 48th O.V.I., and Wm. Watt, Assistant Surgeon of the 48th O.V.I., who actually treated him on the battlefield, stated the wound was from "the bursting of a shell while he was leading the charge on the enemy's fortifications [at Vicksburg] on the 22nd of May [1863]. The shell burst near his head producing a severe concussion, besides bruising & lacerating his face." Parker's wound superficially looked slight, but the trauma of the concussion probably was not. Just after he was mustered out Col. Parker died of what appears to be tuberculosis. He was also suffering from this and extreme diarrhea which delayed his return to the regiment. Col. Sullivan also makes similar remarks about Parker's wound at Arkansas Post. He states that "there were no casualties among the commissioned officers [at Arkansas Post] except a slight flesh-wound which Lieut. Col. Job R. Parker, of said regiment, received at long range in his left forearm, just as the regiment was marching up to its position. And before it was engaged in the action. He immediately retired from the field, and Capt. Peterson, of Company K, then took command and led the regiment into action A few days after he was so wounded, Lieutenant-Colonel Parker went home on a twenty days' leave of absence, and did not again rejoin his regiment until the 27th of April, 1863. Soon after this engagement Capt. Peterson resigned and Capt. Lindsey took command of the regiment." Col. Sullivan neglects to say that Parker returned immediately after he had the wound dressed. Col. Parker set himself up for these attacks by not promptly writing reports on the battles himself. But for Sullivan, who was on leave because of a wound himself for a far longer time, to obliquely attack Parker for doing the same thing hardly seems fair.]
Report of Col. Landram, Brigade Commander.
The advance was conducted in fine style and the men fought bravely. The loss in killed and wounded on this day (May 19th) was sixty-three. On the 20th the 19th Kentucky relieved the 77th Illinois, and together with the 97th and 130th Illinois, skirmished with the enemy during that day. On the 21st the brigade was relieved, and on the 22d was ordered to act as a reserve for the Brigade of General Lawler, of General Carr's Division, which was ordered to storm the enemy's works at ten o'clock A.M. The 77th Illinois and 48th Ohio were ordered to follow the two regiments of General Lawler's Brigade that advanced on his right, and the 19th Kentucky to follow the 97th Illinois which was ordered to report to General Lawler on the left. This movement of the Reserve in columns closed upon the advance, was not in accordance with the plan I had proposed, but being ordered by General Lawler, who had the front, was obeyed.
The Reserve in moving over rough and rugged ground closed upon the advance, was exposed to a constant fire which it could not return, whereas if it had been kept in reserve distance, in rifle range of the enemy's works, it could have covered the advance of General Lawler by a well-directed fire which would have annoyed the enemy and saved the lives of many men, besides being in a position to go to the support of the Brigade in front in proper time.
As it was, all the men were rushed forward in haste, were much wearied, and compelled to stand for nine hours under the hottest fire I ever witnessed. All the troops of the Brigade, with the exception of a few skulkers, behaved with the greatest gallantry. The flag of the 77th Illinois (Col. D. P. Grier) was the first raised upon the large fort in our front, and the two flags of that Regiment, together with that of the 48th Ohio, were the only ones raised upon the fort. [The 22nd Iowa was on the other side of the fort and also claimed the only flag on the works.] The flag of the 130th Illinois was planted in the ground within about ten feet of the fort. I am confident that no troops ever fought better or behaved more nobly than those of this Brigade.
Late in the afternoon the enemy massed their forces in our front and made a desperate effort to dislodge us from our position, which was close to the works, part of the men being inside of the fort, For a moment the men were surprised and wavered, but Col. Grier, Lieut. Col. Webb and Major Hotchkiss of the 77th, and Col. Niles, of the 130th Illinois, waved their swords and rallied their men who opened upon the enemy and by a brilliant charge drove them again from the fort.
The artillery in the rear at that moment rendered the most valuable assistance, in throwing a well-directed and vigorous fire into the enemy's works. I cannot speak too highly in praise of Colonel Grier and his noble Regiment. Their loss was 114 in killed and wounded in a single day. By this determined resistance we were enabled to hold the ground we occupied at the fort until ten o'clock at night, when we were ordered to withdraw."
Col. W. J. Landram, Brigade
Commander
From the History
of the 77th Illinois
|
|
May 23d, we occupied our old camp,…
John A. Bering & Thomas Montgomery, 1880
|
Saturday 23rd Moved into Ravine & lay until dusk [on 22nd], then went with Brigade across R.R. Buried Smith & Yost in one grave near Hqs. Of 10th (Smith's Div.) Division in rear of house on knoll - in edge of woods. (J.Y. A. 48 A.S. A. 48 O.V.) [On 24th] Commanding works during the day & mortars at night. Cyrus Hussey |
Lieut. Peter C. Hains, U.
S. Corps of Engineers, (OR 7/30/63)
…on the 23rd, instant it was announced in orders from headquarters
of the army that the place would be invested at once, and a siege
by regular approaches commenced.
I immediately had as accurate a survey of the ground in front
made as was possible with the assistance at hand. The salients
B, C, and D were selected as the points of attack, one point
of attack for each division of the corps, and proceeded to open
the first parallel and establish enfilading and counter batteries.
Peter C. Hains
